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Intellectual Property 
 
One Step Outside the Country, One Step Back from Patent Infringement 
 
In Zoltek Corp. v. United States,1 the federal circuit addressed two questions related to the remedy available for a 
government contractor’s unauthorized use of a patentee’s patent.  The court found that  (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is inapplicable if 
some of the steps in the claims of a method patent are practiced in a foreign country; and (2) an unauthorized use of a 
patentee’s patent by a government contractor does not amount to a separate taking action under the Fifth Amendment.  
Although the court agreed on the aforementioned points, it could not agree on a rationale as to why.  Such lack of clarity 
makes this opinion incorrigible because it is impossible to wade through its murky waters.   
 
Further confusing the landscape, the court also fails to address in its controlling opinion how 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c), the 
extraterritoriality limitation provision confining U.S. liability to certain domestic activity, fits into the landscape.  Omitting a 
discussion on subsection 1498(c), the only part of the statute addressing territoriality, is confusing and unhelpful.  At the 
heart of failing to write an informative and useful decision is the court’s lack of appreciation as to the purpose and underlying 
principles behind why section 1498 was written.  Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has denied a petition to rehear Zoltek or 
to hear it en banc.2  Thus, no solution to calm the churned-up waters appears to be on the horizon. 
 
In Zoltek, the plaintiff owned a patent on a method to produce silicon fiber products that could be used in stealth 
aircraft.3  The U.S. government, through its contractors, used patentee’s invention in designing and building the F-22 fighter.4  
In producing patentee’s silicon fiber products, the government contractors manufactured and processed some of the sheets 
entirely abroad, and some, the Tyranno fibers, were manufactured abroad and processed in the United States.5  Subsequently, 
patentee sued the United States for unauthorized use of its patent under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.6  The government moved for 
partial summary judgment stating that patentee’s claims were barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c), which prohibits any claim 
arising in a foreign country.7  The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the motion, agreeing that the claim was barred under 
section 1498(c), and “directed plaintiff to amend its complaint to allege a taking under the Fifth Amendment.”8  The trial 
court certified its section 1498 analysis and its holding that the plaintiff’s claims of patent infringement “sounded in the Fifth 
Amendment, under section 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2)” for interlocutory appeal.9 Although the trial court’s analysis addressed 
1498(c) as the reason for why no patent infringement liability attached, the federal circuit did not address that statute in its 
holding. 
 
Section 1498 in pertinent part reads:   
 
(a) Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States is used or 
manufactured by or for the United States without a license of the owner thereof or lawful right to 
manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States 
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture. 
. . .  
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim arising in a foreign country.  
 
The federal circuit produced four opinions in Zoltek, each having different rationales.  In the controlling per curiam 
opinion, two judges (Dyk and Gajarsa) agreed that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 would only hold the United States liable for the use of a 
method patent if each and every step of the claimed method was practiced within the boundaries of the United States.10  They 
                                                     
1  442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir 2006). 
2  Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335 (2006). 
3  Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1347. 
4  Id. at 1349. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  442 F.3d at 1347. 
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also agreed that direct infringement under section 271(a) is a necessary predicate for government liability to attach under 
section 1498, but not agree as to why.11  In addition, the two judges held that alleged patent infringement against the United 
States is not a taking of private property for public use under the Fifth Amendment.12   
 
The second opinion, a concurring opinion by Judge Gajarsa, agrees that 271(a) is a necessary predicate for infringement 
because NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion (NTP)13 stated as much in its reasoning, however erroneously.  Judge Gajarsa 
opines that the rationale for that proposition is weak and is better justified through another line of reasoning.14  He notes that 
in NTP, the federal circuit mischaracterized the holding of Decca v. United States15 in the footnote of another decision, 
Motorola, Inc. v. United States.16  In that case, the court merely was articulating that the government, under 28 U.S.C. § 
1498, cannot be sued for active inducement infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) or for contributory infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(c).17  Thus, finding infringements of sections 271(b) and (c) is precluded in a § 1498 action.  This does not 
mean, however, that a §1498 infringement must be a predicate for a 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) infringement as NTP interpreted the 
situation.18  This mischaracterization is the catalyst for how the waters started to become cloudy.   
 
Instead of relying on NTP’s weak reasoning to reject Zoltek’s claims against the government under § 1498, Judge 
Gajarsa concluded that a “use” of a method claim of a patented invention occurs only when each and every step of that 
method is practiced.19  Further, a use “arises in a foreign country” under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (c) when any one of the claimed 
steps is practiced abroad.20  Thus, Judge Gajarsa would have affirmed the trial court’s findings with respect to its section 
1498(c) analysis and barred plaintiff from its suit, regardless of the NTP precedent.21    
 
Judge Dyk, in his concurring opinion, expressed why he believes NTP was correctly decided in concluding that the 
government “can only be liable for infringement under section 1498(a) if the same conduct would render a private party 
liable for the infringement under section 271(a).”22  Judge Dyk saw the purpose of section 1498(a) as making the government 
and its contractors liable for “use” of a patented invention under the similar circumstances upon which a private party would 
be liable for a direct infringement under section 271(a) in the patent laws.  He did not see a broader and separate purpose for 
why section 1498 was written.   
 
Judge Plager dissented from the per curiam opinion and wrote his views separately.  He did not agree that a claim under 
section 1498 is governed by the limitations of section 271(a).  Judge Plager saw section 271(a) as solely addressing 
infringements among private litigants.23  The only issue Judge Plager agreed with the panel on is that, for an infringement of 
a method claim to occur under 1498(a) or 271(a), each and every step of the method must be practiced.24  He did not agree, 
however, that each step must be practiced within the United States, as is required under section 271(a).25  “[D]ealing with 
infringement litigation between private parties [has] no direct application to infringement litigation against the United States 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.26  Accordingly, Judge Plager would have held that plaintiff has stated a cause of action under § 1498 
                                                     
11  Id. at 1372 (J. Plager, dissenting). 
12  Id. at 1347. 
13  418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
14  Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353. 
15  640 F.2d 1156 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
16  729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
17  Id. 
18  See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1282. 
19  Zoltek,  442 F.3d at 1358. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id .at 1368. 
23  Id. at 1372. 
24  Id. at 13779. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. (citing Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
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with regard to the Tyranno mats manufactured in Japan, but processed in the United States.27  He would have found no cause 
of action for all activity occurring entirely outside U.S. boundaries.28 
 
In addition, Judge Plager analyzed in great detail why the unauthorized use of a patent by the government or its 
contractors exercises the taking power of the government requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.29  His 
professorial opinion exhibited an incredible command of takings law and is extremely convincing.  For example:   
 
In my view, the existence of a proper takings claim is an issue wholly independent of whether under § 1498 
there is a valid claim that triggers a remedy under that statute.  The latter is a question of statutory right 
granted by Congress under its legislative authority pursuant to the Constitution; the former is a matter of 
constitutional principle the vindication of which Congress has properly provided for by remedy in the Court 
of Federal Claims pursuant to the provisions of the Tucker Act.  The mixing and merging of these two 
separate legal concepts in the manner the majority has done is incorrect as a matter of law, and leads them 
to an erroneous conclusion.30   
 
In reading through these four opinions, very little is agreed upon and the sole areas of agreement have no common 
rationale.  What is missing in all of these opinions is the purpose behind why section 1498 was written and the underlying 
policy reasons behind the statute.  Judge Plager noted that section 1498 and section 271 relate to different players, the 
government and private litigants, but did not delve into this issue more deeply.   
 
In 1928, the Supreme Court of the United States, with Chief Justice Taft writing for the Court, addressed the purpose of 
granting patentees a remedy against the United States where the government, through its own use or through that of its 
contractors, used a patent without a license.31  The Court referred to the Naval Appropriations Act of 1918, the precursor to 
1498(a), in holding that the “purpose of the [act] was to stimulate contractors and furnish what was needed for the war, 
without fear of becoming liable themselves for infringements to inventors or owners or assignees of patents.”32  The Court 
further held that Congress, in passing the 1918 Act, “intended to secure to the owner of the patent the exact equivalent of 
what it was taking away from him. . . .”33  Although the Court was clear in the purpose of the 1918 Act, the Federal Circuit 
failed to adequately address the purposes behind 28 U.S.C. § 1428 in Zoltek. 
 
Instead, the federal circuit compared the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) of the Patent Act with that of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) 
instead of looking at the broad policy reasons behind section 1498 on its own merits.  In other words, the court failed to 
acknowledge that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 1498 is to protect the procurement process from any disruption through 
eliminating the threat of patent infringement lawsuits against U.S. government contractors.34  Evidence that the purpose of 
1498 is distinct from that of the Patent Act lies in the different remedies available.  The Patent Act in Title 35 of the United 
States Code, allows for adequate compensation for patent infringement in various forms, including but not limited to, lost 
profits,35 reasonable royalty,36 treble damages,37 injunctions,38 and attorney fees.39  In contrast, the remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 
1498 is limited to “reasonable and entire compensation,” which disfavors awarding lost profits,40 and punitive damages,41 and 
                                                     
27  Id. at 1385 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 1374-78. 
30  Id. at 1378. 
31  Richmond Screw Anchor Co., Inc. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343-45 (1928). 
32  Richmond, 275 U.S. at 345.  David R. Lipson, We’re Not Under Title 35 Anymore:  Patent Litigation Against the United States Under 28 U.S.C. 1498(A), 
33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 243, 247 (Fall 2003). 
33  Richmond, 275 U.S. at 345. 
34  See id. at 343-45; see also Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (citing Richmond, 275 U.S. at 343). 
35  35 U.S.C.S. § 284 (LEXIS 2006). 
36  Id. 
37  Id. § 284. 
38  Id. § 283. 
39  Id. § 285. 
40  Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 208 (1996) (rejecting the trial court’s award of lost profits because such a remedy assumes a right of 
exclusivity that does not exist in 1498 actions, which allow the United States to take a compulsory license) (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 
20.03[6], at 20-27 (1992).  Lessona Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 208 (1979) (en banc) (rejecting the trial court’s award of lost profits and double 
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injunctions are generally unavailable.42 Thus, the remedies alone make recovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 different from that 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271.   
 
Instead of being a case that clarifies a patentee’s remedy for the government’s unauthorized use of a patent, Zoltek 
creates more questions than answers. 
Lieutenant Colonel Katherine E. White 
 
 
Government Contractor and Grant Researcher Affirmative Defenses Against Patent Infringement 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Acquisition personnel are being tasked to keep pace with as well as innovate in the procurement and management of 
intellectual property assets for the benefit of the U.S. government.  Along these lines, the U.S. government has increased 
federal spending for the development of research laboratories and research programs within private and public university 
settings.  Practical and technical procurement and grant issues arise when the U.S. government undertakes research 
relationships with universities and private laboratories.  These issues range from whether procurement regulations apply to 
agreements entered into between the federal government and contractors or grant recipients, to whether universities are 
performing research “on behalf of the government” in order to qualify for immunity from claims of infringement of 
intellectual property.  The Federal District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina recently considered the latter issue 
in Madey v. Duke University.43  This case represents protracted litigation which begun in 1995 involving claimed patent 
rights of a university researcher and alleged patent infringement based on unauthorized use of patented inventions by Duke 
University. 
 
The issues raised and addressed in the district court’s decision in Madey v. Duke University are significant to the U.S. 
government, specifically the Department of Defense’s research and technology innovation missions.  Specifically, 
universities represent fertile ground for conducting cutting-edge basic and applied research.  In fact, the research being done 
by university faculty and graduate students is often a major component in the federal government’s race to remain ahead of 
foreign governments in the development of dual-use technologies.  Accordingly, Madey v. Duke University is an important 
case for government attorneys, acquisition/grant professionals, and technical managers to consider so that the U.S. 
government can better ensure that universities and their talented personnel remain willing and able to perform research under 
government contracts or federal grants, absent the specter of potential claims of intellectual property infringement. 
 
 
II.  Background 
 
In 1988, Duke University hired Dr. John M.J. Madey, a prominent scientist in the field of laser technology, as a 
professor in the physics department.  Duke expected Dr. Madey to assist in establishing a Free Electron Laser Laboratory 
(FEL Lab) as well as assist the university to obtain federal research grants.44  Dr. Madey in fact assisted Duke in obtaining 
federal research grants from the Office of Naval Research (ONR).45  Dr. Madey’s FEL Lab contained substantial equipment 
that required Duke to construct an extension onto its physics building in order to house the equipment. Several pieces of 
equipment contained in Dr. Madey’s lab were covered by patents owned by Madey, i.e., U.S. Patent No. 4,641,103 covering 
a microwave electron gun, and U.S. Patent No. 5,130,994 covering a free-electron laser oscillator for simultaneous narrow 
spectral resolution and fast time resolution spectroscopy.46 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
damages as beyond the reasonable and entire compensation damages permitted under 1498). See Lipson, supra note 32, at 253-54 (discussing the disfavored 
status of lost profits in § 1498 actions because they are based in an eminent domain theory that allows the United States to take a license and is at odds with 
an exclusive right). 
41  Lessona, 36 Fed. Cl. at 208. 
42  W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating:  “In our view, the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), which the 
injunction is said to contravene, assures it that right without interference from [alleged infringer].” 
43  413 F. Supp. 2d 601 (M.D.N.C. 2006). 
44  Id. at 603. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
